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Italy has more solar capacity than Japan, the US and China together
In Italy we say "those who gave gave, those who got got, let's forget
about the past!"
(c) Thinkstock
5 July 2012
How solar subsidies can distort the power market: the case of Italy
By Carlo Stagnaro
Italian policies to stimulate power production have been a success in the sense that solar power capacity has exploded, but they have also
led to formidable costs. What is more, argues Carlo Stagnaro of the Italian think tank Istituto Bruno Leoni, support for green power has
profoundly distorted the functioning of the Italian energy market. As solar power is subsidized and given unlimited priority access to the grid,
the size of the "contestable market", where power producers compete with each other, has shrunk dramatically. Stagnaro warns that the
measures now being discussed to remedy the problems will put further pressure on the market model in Italy and lead to more control from
above.
In terms of investments, Italy's experience with solar power is definitely a success. According to the
European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA), Italy was the world's top photovoltaic (PV)
market in 2011, with 9.3 GW of newly installed capacity. At the end of 2011, the amount of installed
PV capacity worldwide was 69.7 GW, of which 51.7 GW in Europe and 12.8 GW in Italy. This
means that in the Bel Paese you may find a quarter of European solar panels and almost one fifth of
the global ones. Only Germany has more PV capacity. Indeed, Italy has more solar capacity than
Japan, the US and China together.
But the success of Italian solar power came at a cost. It is built on Italy's very generous incentive
scheme, based on an extremely high feed-in tariff that is awarded to PV-installations (at least, to
installations that were built before the end of June 2011). In addition, distributors are required to
accept and dispatch "green" energy with top priority, regardless of the volumes offered. The
combination of a guaranteed high price and virtually unlimited supply created the grounds for the
boom.
Not only has government support for solar power led to high costs (€3.9 billion in subsidies in 2011 alone), it has also had another unforeseen effect: it has
undermined the very market design that, until recently, had worked remarkably well, and had made Italy one of the most competitive electricity markets in
Europe.
In this article I will take a look at how the support scheme developed, how it is undermining the functioning of the market, and what is likely to happen next.
Conto energia
In 2003, Italy introduced a 20-year feed-in tariff, the "primo conto energia", which entered into force on 19 September 2005. Thanks to the generosity of this
subsidized tariff (which could be as high as €490/MWh for large solar plants, vis-à-vis an average energy price on the day-ahead market in 2005 of
€58.59/MWh) the first energy law was a resounding success. It allowed for a maximum of 100 MW of solar power to be admitted to subsidies. This target
was reached in 9 days, and in the following 2 months further requests arrived for 300 MW more. The cap was increased to 500 MW per year already in
2006.
In 2006 a new government under prime minister Romano Prodi appointed a Green politician as Environmental Minister. Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio reformed
the feed-in tariff and in 2007 a secondo conto energia was introduced: the cap was removed, a reduced VAT of 10% (instead of 20%) wasapplied to PV
producers, and the authorization process was made easier. The incentives
didn't change much, except that up to then larger plants had been
subsidized the most, and thereafter the opposite became true. The results
showed quickly. In 2008 PV capacity grew fivefold, from 87 MW in 2007 to 432 MW. The aggregate cost of incentives also began to become serious,
reaching €110 million in 2008. In 2009 the trend continued: installed capacity tripled, reaching 1,144 MW, and so did incentives, increasing up to €303
million cumulatively.
While the burden of incentives grew, the cost of panels started to fall sharply, making PV investments a cash cow with almost no investment risk, wide
access to project financing (up to 80/90%) and an estimated return on equity that could be higher than 20%. A wide debate resulted in the new Italian
government (Silvio Berlusconi and his center right coalition had won the elections in 2008), which led to a terzo conto energia introduced in 2010, with a
sort of haircut on incentives. In order to comply with the EU's climate and energy objectives, a national target of 8,000 MW of PV power to be installed by
2020 was adopted. The 8,000 MW figure relied on a 2007 "Position Paper" adopted by the center-left government. The methodology of the Paper was never
made transparent, and many - myself included - believed the target to be overestimated.
Despite the political turmoil, the investment boom in PV continued, and in 2010 the installed capacity tripled (up to 3.47 GW) and so did the incentives
(€800 million were paid that year). The haircut had not been sufficient, and the government felt that a new reform was needed. By mid 2011 a quarto conto
energia was introduced, with lower incentives that gradually decreased over time, and an annual cap.
But PV producers had found a very convenient legal loophole. In 2010 legislation had been passed (the so-called "decreto salva Alcoa", named after the
failed attempt to create conditions for the aluminum producer Alcoa not to shut down its factories in Sardegna), which allowed for PV plants authorized
before June 30, 2011 to be operated and subsidized under the (very) generous terms of the secondo conto energia. Notwithstanding the terzo conto energia
being already in force and a quarto conto energia being discussed, the
decreto was held to apply to all PV power producers. To make things
worse, the number of requests was so high that it was practically
impossible to verify all of them within the 60 days deadline established by
law. It is now a common belief that a significant number of power plants that were built well after the deadline, but had filed the request in time, were
allowed the salva Alcoa benefits. Of course there is no way to tell how many and which ones (in Italy we say "those who gave gave, those who got got,
let's forget about the past!").
To make a long story short: by the end of 2011, 12,750 MW of PV power had been installed. This time the cost of incentives became definitely too high to
be ignored: more than €3.9 billion in one year. This amount will further increase in the next few years, although not as fast as in the past. You can guess
the reason for that is... we are now adopting a quinto conto energia.
However, the problem with PV power is not just the burden of incentives. It is also the effect that solar power has on the rest of the market.
Balancing costs and grid congestion
On March 30, 2012 the Italian consumers received bad news. A press release from the Autorità per l'energiaelettrica e il gas (the independent regulatory
body for gas and power) announced that electricity prices would increase, for an average household, by 9.8%. (In Italy there is a "reference price" for
households that have not yet closed a deal on the free market; they are covered by a government-controlled "Single Buyer".) 4% was attributed to the
growing cost of renewable incentives alone. Of the remaining 5.8%, "the indirect effect of intermittent renewables is worth about 40%", the regulator said, or
2.32%. In addition, the Autorità predicted that in 2012 the cost of solar subsidies will increase to €6 billion. In July the cost of electricity to households
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Figure 1. Electricity production from PV power. Click
to enlarge (Source: own elaboration on GSE data)
Figure 2. Congested nodes in the high-voltage power
grid in Italy. Click to enlarge (Source: Terna)
Figure 3. Total electricity demand in Italy. Click to
enlarge (Source: own elaboration on Terna data)
Figure 4. "Contestable market", or total demand minus
subsidized production, and renewable production.
Click to enlarge (Source: own elaboration on Gse data)
grew again by 0.2%, resulting from a decrease of the market price of electricity and an increase of subsidies and balancing costs.
To understand what is happening, one must know how the power market works in the first place. On the day-ahead market supply and demand bids are
matched. However, renewable production is awarded a priority dispatch - i.e., whenever green energy is produced and not self-consumed, the network
operator must deliver it with priority over conventional production. Everyday, the GSE (Gestore dei Servizi Energetici, a government-controlled entity which
is in charge of managing the support schemes for renewables and of marketing the green energy) estimates the solar (and other renewables) production for
the following day, so the volume of electricity actually traded is equal to the expected demand minus the demand share covered by bilateral contracts
minus the expected "green" production. If green production happens to be higher or lower than expected (for example because the sky is more or less
cloudy than expected), conventional producers must be called in to adjust their production on a real-time basis - through the balancing markets - which is
more costly than normal production both for economic and technical reasons. This was not a problem when intermittent production covered just a small
share of total consumption. Nowadays however, as the graph below shows, things have become quite different. (Admittedly, GSE seems to make little
effort to develop reliable forecasts for the intermittent power generation.)
In 2011 total demand in Italy was around 332.3 TWh. As can be seen from the chart, PV covered
almost 3% of this. As small as this share may appear, it is enough to create major disruptions -
especially if grid congestions are considered, which amplify the effects of over- or under-production.
Moreover, this 3% of total production is generated only during certain hours of the day (when the sun
is high in the sky). Under certain conditions (the "Shiny Sunny Sunday") solar production may
actually cover almost all the demand!
The grid congestion issue is also particularly relevant if one considers that most photovoltaic
installations are in the South of the country, while the largest consumers (industries) are based in
the North, and that the high-voltage lines on the North-South direction are frequently congested (as
the following figure from the TSO, Terna, shows). And we have not even mentioned the technical
difficulties for local distributors to manage a high number of small, intermittent inputs. Distribution
networks are not always able to deal with such massive, distributed generation: to do so they require
major investments. Such investments sometimes need an ad hoc policy framework to be developed,
as Simona Benedettini and Federico Pontoni described with regard to Italy's and UK's ongoing
reform processes.
The cost of imbalances was high enough to
lead to a significant increase in the electricity
bill for households and businesses. Part of the
problem lies in the political decision to charge
such cost to the consumers.The underlying justification is that green production is in the "general
interest" and, therefore, its costs should be borne entirely by "society". However, it is now clear that
such a rule may be consistent with a generating park where renewables cover a small share, but
becomes increasingly problematic as the contribution of clean technologies grow. The rule may
require a major change - which is, in fact, being considered. The idea is that producers, not
consumers, should borne the cost of imbalances. If correctly implemented, this would have several
consequences: for example, renewable producers would have an implicit incentive to better manage
their generation portfolio in order to offset one plant's imbalances with another plant's production (or
lack thereof), or to cover themselves against such risk by investing in either storage technologies (to
accumulate and release energy when their plants over- or under-produce) or through financial
instruments. Alternatively, they might be interested in marketing their production by themselves,
instead of going through the GSE.
Contestable market
Renewable energy production doesn't happen in a void - it is part of a broader productive context.
After a long period of growth, Italian demand for electricity sharply fell as a consequence of the 2009
recession, and then had only a minor rebound. 
Given the country's economic outlook and the strong correlation between electricity demand and
economic growth, it is unlikely that consumption will grow significantly in the foreseeable future –
orthat it will grow at all. At the same time, the amount of non-marketed (subsidized) energy is
growing, which displaces conventionally produced power and creates a gloomy scenario for
itsproducers asthe size of the “contestable”part of the market is shrinking.It fell from292 TWh in 2007
to 248 TWh in 2011 (-15%). 
Comparing Figures 3 and 4 one may infer that the size of the "contestable" market did not decrease
just because of the crisis - indeed, it decreased also because of the growth in green production
(especially solar PV). Green production is independent of market signals, because it doesn't receive
any price signal (the tariff is known in advance, at least for PV, while other renewable sources are
subsidized through more complex "green certificates" schemes that despite several corrections have
proven to be very inefficient - but this is a
different story). Neither does it incorporate any
volumerisk, because the power grid is mandated to dispatch any single green kWh. Green
production has not even had to face any forecasting risk, as the produced volumes are injected in the
grid irrespectively of forecasts communicated to the TSO, without any penalty for wrong forecasting.
Unfortunately as it happened, while demand was decliningand green production increasing in Italy,
conventional generation capacity kept growing. This was mainly a result of the normal project
commissioning time lag. Thus average thermal capacity available at peak time in Italy rosefrom
39,900 MW in 2000 to 53,700 MW in 2010 (Italy has no nuclear power). This means that the ratio
between "contestable market" and thermal capacity, i.e. the number of hours when conventional
plants compete between them, has fallen from 6,204 to 4,620 hours. In other words, the ratio has
fallen from over 70% of the total number of hours in a year (8,760) to 53% - and it is still decreasing.
In 2012 the ratio may fall further to about 40% (3,500 hours). What this means is that a growing
amount of conventional capacity is increasingly under-utilised, making it more and more difficult for
operators to recover their fixed costs.
Even this doesn't really catch the whole picture. Conventional production is displaced as far as requested volumes are concerned, butbad news comesfrom
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Electricity prices by evening can be higher than peak-time prices - this
after a long campaign to convince Italians to shift consumption to the
night in order to save money!
Figure 5. Day-ahead market prices in Italy on Thursday
M ay 10, 2012 (panel above) Thursday M ay 14, 2009
(panel below). Click to enlarge (Source: GME, Italian power
exchange)
the price end, too. Solar power produces in the central period of the day - when demand is also at its maximum, and where prices used to be the highest.
In a marginal pricing system, where the clearing price at any given moment is equal to the marginal cost of the marginal power plant (the least efficient and
most costly at that given time), solar power usually bids at zero euro - because it gets the tariff after all, so it is indifferent to market prices. That means
that the merit order curve shifts and the marginal power plant becomes a more efficient, less costly one. As a result, conventional producers face falling
demand and falling prices (therefore shrinking margins). It has been estimated that peak-time power prices in summer might have decreased up to 30-50%
as a resultof PV production.
Conventional producers may enjoy just one advantage. When solar production falls late in the afternoon, conventional power plants must start up
production rapidly. This requires CCGTs (combined- cycle gas turbines)
to ramp up production very fast, which - for the marginal power plant -
implies relatively high marginal costs. A clever portfolio management of
their power plants may allow them to recover some of the lost margin,
with the paradoxical result that electricity prices by evening tend to be
almost as high or, occasionally, higher than peak-time prices. This after a several years-long campaign to convince Italians to shift consumption to the
night in order to save money!
The following figure shows how the market changed. In 2009 (panel below), when the amount of solar power was much lower, the peak price in the market
occurred when demand was also at its peak. Now that most demand at peak-time is met by solar power, prices at peak-time are relatively low. At the
same time, when the sun goes down solar panels suddenly stop production, and CCGTs start up production, which pushes prices upwards. This happens
at a time of day when total demand is relatively low (as compared to morning-time demand) and lasts for a limited period of time. 
While the demand levels and shapes aresimilar, the shape of the price curves is radically different,
and it is likely to keep changing as solar power increases its contribution.
What should be emphasized is that conventional producers do not suffer as a result merely of
normal "market risk". They are losing market shares and profits not only as a consequence of their
over-investments, or because they weren't able to foresee the looming economic crisis, but also as
a result of political and regulatory measures. Consider, for example, that the time-to-market for a
CCGT lasts at least five years, mainly because of the length of the authorization process. This
means that a power plant completed in 2010 was conceived in 2005. Could the plant operator
possibly have figured out in 2005 that, in 5 years time, 5 different incentive schemes would have
been introduced for solar power and that this would have led PV capacity to skyrocket from 7 MW
in 2005 to 12.75 GW in 2011? A growth by almost 1821 times, or 182043%, is not a black swan: it
is a polka-dotted swan!
Major problems
So we have at least four major problems. 
The first problem is the cost of incentives. No conclusive solution is at hand, at least as far as the
already-installed capacity is concerned: the government committed itself to pay a given amount of
subsidies to PV producers, and commitments must be honored - especially in a country which is
already perceived as overly risky to invest in.
The second problem is the increasing imbalance cost due to the amount of intermittent power
capacity. Italy's energy regulator has recently proposed a new regulation, whereby the cost of
imbalances is no longer charged to the consumers, but is borne by those who caused the
imbalance itself. From a distributional point of view, this makes perfect sense. In fact imbalances
are the equivalent of a negative externality that can be easily internalized, under a proper set of
rules. Moreover, the socialization of balancing costs is the equivalent of a hidden subsidy to
intermittent sources of energy, which gives them a competitive advantage over non-intermittent
technologies - including the carbon-free ones, such as bio-energies, hydropower, or thermal power
plants equipped with carbon capture and sequestration facilities. Such a discrimination cannot
possibly be justified on environmental grounds and it causes additional unjustified distortions in the
market.
The third problem is that a large and increasing share of intermittent production creates technical
problems in the power grid that, perhaps, in the future will be solved by smart grids, but in the
present need to be addressed. The most basic answer to this is the creation and maintenance of a
significant "reserve capacity", either through "capacity payment" tools, which would remunerate
electrical companies for keeping in operationreserve capacity, or by building batteries, pumped-
storage hydroelectric plants, or other accumulators. The former solution is supported in Italy by the
regulator and by most conventional producers; the latter is suggested by the TSO Terna.
Both these measures would have the effect of further shrinking the area of the "contestable"
market, since the increase in production capacity would be subtracted from the usual supply and
demand process, and would be substantially dependent on political or regulatory decisions.So, in
addition to the cost involved, they would imply a major change in the way markets are organized.
There would be less competition "in the field" and more and more control from above, with the consumers paying not for the energy they consume, but for
the capacity which is installed and maintained, regardless of whether and how much it is used.
The fourth problem lies in the growing conventional overcapacity. This is not a social problem per se, if it results from wrong investments. But here rapidly
changing government policies played a major role. Although conventional power producers should not be paid for mistakes they made, they at least should
not be over-taxed. In 2008, Italy introduced the so-called "Robin Hood Tax" on energy producers. After several increases, the Robin Hood Tax is now 10.5
percentage points additional on top of the "usual" corporate tax rate (27.5%). Repealing this tax would be a reasonable measure.
Less competition
So what will happen next? At this moment, some measures are being taken. Green subsidies are being cut - and they are likely to further decrease in the
future, to reflect the expected reduction in the costs of solar power. This will at least alleviate the burden of future incentives, but it will have little effect on
the subsidies that have already been committed.
Secondly, renewable energy producers will be asked to cover balancing costs at least in part. A war between vested interests is already going on as to
how to address the balancing problem. Terna is demanding the right to invest in storage capacity, which is controversial, as it would make the TSO a
market player, able to decide where storages are located and how they should be managed. Conventional generators are asking for a capacity payment
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mechanism to be introduced. This demand is very likely to be honoured, but theamount and the design of the scheme are not sure yet.
Whatever measure - or mix of measures - will be taken, it is clear that the functioning of the market will be affected. The measures that are now being
discussed will change producers' incentives and will change Italy's electricity system from a market model characterized by many different market players
taking a large number of interacting, decentralized decisions to one dominated by a small number of political or regulatory choices. There will probably be
less competition and more lobbying. Consumers will feel the difference, too: as a larger part of the bill will be politically determined, and they will have less
choice in electricity provider. Many benefits of competitive markets might be lost.
All in all there seem to be no easy solutions and, perhaps, no solution at all, except that many people will have to pay for the defects in the system - be
they consumers, conventional producers, or even, in the future, renewable energy producers. But at least the Italian experience may provide a useful
lesson: policies aimed at changing the structure of the power system too rapidly may ensure that targets are met, but not necessarily in a way that is
consistent with the "public interest".
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information as soon as you are ready w ith it. 
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DUNCAN dauson
lambart
Thank you for elaborating. How ever, I observe that most problems you describe w ith
solar in Italy also occur w hen it is developed w ithout government intervention, such
as is currently the case in the Netherlands (although a subsidy scheme for 30.000
systems w as installed recently, most systems are currently build w ithout receiving
any subsidy in the Netherlands). Therefore, I sometimes think it w ould be more fruitful
to adapt the energy market to these new  forms of energy than nolens volens trying to
fit them to a market-logic that w as designed for dispatchable energy sources. A
commendable article w as published by Energy Policy recently along this line of
thought by Schleicher-Tappeser: How  renew ables w ill change electricity markets in
the next f ive years
Rick Bosman
Dear Mr Bosman,
Thank you for your interesting comment w hich helps me to clarify my point of view .
Of course I dealt w ith a very specif ic issue - the effect of decentralized, subsidized
generation on the market functioning in a relatively liberalized market. In such
perspective, my ow n definition of the public interest is "having a w ell-functioning
market", w hich - all else being equal - w ill result not just in low er prices but also in a
more differentiated supply and a higher quality (less interruptions etc.). I agree that
there may be additional goals w hich are w orth being pursued (such as minimizing
health or environmental impact) but there are specif ic policies aimed at it and, as I
understand, the cost of most externalities is already internalized (incidentally I think a
100 US$ / tonCO2 figure may be overestimating it, but this is not the point). Among
these policies, I'd like to mention environmental standards on most pollutants, the ETS,
renew able subsidies, etc. In other w ords, I argue that the problem is that some of
these policies are negatively correlated w ith other (for example the rules underlying a
competitive market) and this produces negative consequences (for example
conventional pow er plants, being under-used, are likely to generate higher emissions
per unit of energy produced) as w ell as non-necessary extra costs. There is no
reason, if  you believe w e should be more careful about the environment, to jeopardize
the market, as competition may indeed by a pow erful ally in promoting energy
conservation, competitive "clean" sources, etc.
On your second point, I w ould agree if the "many decentralized subjects" w ere not
paid a political tarif f  w hich is equal for all and w ere not granted that all their
production w ould be dispatched. Absent price- and volume-risk, there is no
competition. On the contrary conventional, non-subsidized producers must compete to
sell energy and have no price-certainty.
carlo stagnaro
13/11/12
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Dear Mr. Stagnaro, thank you for your insightful article. What struck me is that the
developments you define as problems, I see as great signals of an energy transition in
acceleration phase. I'm w ondering how  come our interpretation is so different and I
believe it is in defining the 'public interest'. In your article you seem to take a rather
narrow  view  on the public interest as low  energy cost (correct me if I'm w rong).
How ever, if  you w ould take a broader interpretation, for example including minimizing
environmental and health effects of the energy supply. One could go even further, by
including social unrest for and by climate refugees, a problem w hich directly affects
Italy. By including such factors in the definition of 'public interest', a completely
different picture emerges. 
Furthermore, I found your suggestion to view  imbalances caused by variable
renew able sources as negative externalities that should be internalized very
interesting. I think w e should definitely do so, but of course not before all negative
externalities of the traditional energy supply are included f irst. Just to name one: the
social costs of CO2-emissions have been estimated at at least $100/t in a recent
Cambridge study
http://w w w .jbs.cam.ac.uk/research/w orking_papers/2011/w p1105.pdf 
Another interesting conclusion is that you think that as a result of more decentralized
energy production 'Italy's electricity system w ill change from a market model
characterized by many different market players (...) to one dominated by a small
number of political or regulatory choices. There w ill probably be less competition and
more lobbying.' I can easily make the exact opposite claim, that w ith so many
independent energy producers, there is much more competition and much less market
pow er for a couple of large energy companies. I w ould be very interested if  you
could elaborate your view  a bit.
Rick Bosman
@MikeParr - Italy has enjoyed a relatively w ell-functioning market since 2004 (w hen
the pow er echange w as created and the transmission netw ork's ow nership w as
unbundled from Enel) until last year or so. This allow ed, for example, about half of the
generating portfolio to be renew ed in less than 10 years and pow er prices to grow
less than inflation. Also the quality of the service improved and the cost of regulated
services decreased dramatically. 
@MarkLively - I fully agree. The key is to correctly move the imbalancing cost upon
those w ho cause the imbalance, i.e. intermittent producers. It w ill be up to them to f ind
the solution w hich is more technically and economically convenient.
@KalevKallemets - w e have a large hydro pumping capacity that might be better
used, and you can also invest in batteries in specif ic contexts. And don't
underevaluate w hat innovation may do (think, for example, of CSP solar plants, that
may be used to store thermal energy to be converted into electricity later on).
@Andrew MCKILLOP - w ell, if  you escape a model that proved to w ork better than
any available alternative to go into a mess, that IS a problem.
carlo stagnaro
The problem w ith escaping from the market model, Andrew ? What about cumulative
subsidies of over €15 billion for 3% of the electricity supply?
Karel Beckman
What is the problem w ith "escaping from the market model", of w hich the ultimate
w orst example w as Enron ?
The German stadtw erke (neither state nor corporate capitalism) have a rather popular
and socially approved "market model" w ell adapted to decentralized energy.
In other w ords for decentralized energy you need decentralized capitalism w ith a
much more accountable and socially responsible operating method.
Andrew MCKILLOP
"Storage, of course, could play a role in this"- w e'll, storing some % of total Italian
daily pow er production meaning some 5-10 GWh, requires some 3-5GW storage
capacity. Hydro is basically only option, but is takes many years to plan and build (in
EU) and is not w ithout cost. So, you just can't toss it around like "go ahead and store".
Kalev Kallemets
If  w ind is distorting the forw ards market, there needs to be a better w ay to price
imbalances, the difference betw een the schedule in the forw ards market and w hat is
actually delivered, as I discussed last w eek in “Competitive Markets for Imbalances,
Not Penalties,” Staff Technical Conference on Increasing Real-Time and Day-Ahead
Market Eff iciency through Improved Softw are, FERC Docket No. AD10-12-003, 2012
June 25-27, w hich can be accessed from my w eb page (w w w .LivelyUtility.com) or
from the FERC w eb page (FERC.gov).
Mark Lively
There are a couple of statements made by Mr Stagnaro that need to be challenged.
Number 1 is that PV has:
“has undermined the very market design that, until recently, had w orked remarkably
w ell, and had made Italy one of the most competitive electricity markets in Europe”.
Mr Stagnaro notes that Italy legislated for FiT in 2003. One supposes that up to that
point the Italian electrical market w as w orking w ell? So w ell that in September 2003
the w hole of Italy lost pow er for a w hole day. The reasons are that about 25% of
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Italian pow er came over the Alps in 203. This w as because for more than 20 years
Italy had not invested in its ow n generation. Still as Mr Stagnaro notes “the market
w as functioning w ell”. That’s w hat counts, not w hether a state has a reliable pow er
supply but if  a market functions w ell. Interesting little story – if  only it w ere true.
Moving onw ards & upw ards. Storage is probably the answ er to PV – but this is
glossed over in the article despite the fact that several ready-to-go storage
technologies exist w hich could provide regional (voltage control) and national
(ancillary services) solutions.
In terms of subsidies, I note from a Bloomberg New  Energy Finance presentation of
April 2012, PV is now  w ell below  parity in terms of residential/retail energy costs in
Italy. LCEO for PV in Italy is 18 eurocents/kWhr. The retail price of electricity inn Italy
(EC w eb site) is betw een 21 and 27 eurocents. This raises questions such as: w hy
any subsidy for PV installed in the residential sector? If I w as a DNO I w ould see PV
providing an answ er to the “peak load @ mid-day problem” w hich I guess is an on-
going issue for ENEL. Storage, of course, could play a role in this (store excess
pow er and deploy in the evening to meet that nasty evening peak.
Plenty of solutions exist now  for the Italian PV problem. The issue is, does Enel and
the other players w ant to deploy them.
Mike Parr
